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Abstract 
This paper explores the fundamental influence of consumer rating behavior on an 
emerging third-party software application market, mobile app market. In app market, 
consumers’ ex ante belief on app utility essentially is determined by the app rating while 
at the same time the app rating itself is derived from the ex post utility obtained by 
purchased customers. We develop an analytical model which explicitly characterizes 
this bidirectional rating-utility conversion based on a newly introduced concept 
“reservation rating”. After building this conversion process into the utility function, we 
examine the market equilibrium and show how change in consumer rating attitude, 
such as being severer in offering ratings or being less critical in accepting ratings, 
would affect the developers’ optimal choices of app price and app quality level as well as 
the platform owner’s optimal revenue sharing policy. 
Keywords:  Online Word of Mouth, Mobile commerce, E-business, Pricing IS 
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Introduction 
The traditional third-party application market is now heading towards its next phase. It has been 
witnessed that a novel third-party application market, mobile app market, is currently experiencing its 
explosive growth despite the recent economic downturn. Apple App Store, the world’s leading mobile app 
market launched in July 2008, reached total number of 10 billion downloads in Jan. 2011 while it was just 
3 billion in Jan. 2010 (Wall Street Journal Jan. 2011). Kaufman Brothers L.P estimated that over $1 
billion revenue was generated from more than 350,000 applications inside the Apple App Store in 2010 
and Citibank expected this revenue figure to be $2 billion in 2011. Following Apple’s move, Google, 
Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM) and Amazon opened their own mobile app stores. Gartner Inc. 
forecasted the total revenue of entire mobile app market will hit $15.1 billion in 2011, almost tripled its 
$5.2 billion in 2010. It will further increase to $35 billion in 2014 according to International Data Corp. 
(IDC)’s projection. Meanwhile, the tremendous success in this novel market is initiating a new trend 
which may change the whole climate of future third-party application market. Enlightened by the success 
of Apple App Store, Apple extended the same business model to desktop and laptop applications. On Jan 
6th 2011, Mac App Store was opened with more than 1,000 computer apps out of the gate. In just 20 days, 
Pixelmator, a small software company, achieved 1 million dollar sale on Jan 25th from its one single 
image processing application sold at unit price $29.99. Traditional giant software companies such as 
Autodesk also joined the Mac App Store. The market is so enticing that even Microsoft, Apple’s major 
competitor, is considering bringing its Microsoft Office’s Mac version onto Mac App Store. “It’s something 
we are looking at”, said Amanda Lefebvre, Microsoft’s senior marketing manager (PCWorld Jan. 2011).  
Concerning this newly emerging economy, the adverse selection caused by information asymmetry is a 
serious issue which could potentially dismantle the market (Akerlof 1970) due to the following reasons. 
First, software product belongs to experience goods of which consumers can hardly observe true quality 
ex ante (Shapiro 1985). Second, even if the “objective” true quality is observed, it could mean different 
utility for different consumer depending on the consumer’s subjective valuation for quality. The 
discounted utility is not necessarily known to the consumer herself/himself ex ante (Chen and Xie 2008). 
Third, one nature of the app market, the mixture of individual app developers and organizational app 
developers, generates greater belief dispersion on quality than the situation in which vendors are 
relatively more homogenous. Thus, without signals to distinguish the quality of the apps, consumers are 
almost clueless about their own ex post utility so that hardly figure out the corresponding willingness to 
pay. Adverse selection starts to occur and will potentially turn down the market. 
To counter adverse selection, the rating, as derived from consumers’ ex post experience, is a good source 
for consumers to form the correct ex ante beliefs on ex post net utility and therefore determine their 
willingness to pay (Li and Hitt 2010, Sun 2010). Though it is not the only source, it is much more 
influential than other factors in the app market compared to being in other markets. This is firstly because 
in the app market a plenty amount of ratings are aggregated and available at one single site easily to be 
found, such as iTunes for Apple. So it would not suffer the problem that ratings are widely distributed in 
multiple sites such that evidence from one single site doesn’t have strong power to convey the quality 
message to consumers. Secondly, consumers are allowed to rate at that site only after they purchase the 
app, which to a large extent avoids shilling behavior so that keeps high credibility for ratings. Third, most 
importantly, other signaling devices such as advertising and branding are usually relatively weak due to 
individual developers’ budget constraint or lack of marketing capability. Therefore, rating is the main 
criterion consumers rely on in the app market. Besides the consumers, developers and platform owners 
also pay significant attentions on ratings. Evidence from real business practices shows that the rating is 
one of the hottest topics and the biggest concerns among developers. Tens of thousands of posts on 
iPhonedevsdk.com, one of the most popular online iPhone developer communities, are related to how to 
improve ratings and how ratings affect the app sales revenue. Furthermore, since the developer agrees 
upon a revenue sharing contract with the platform owner, the platform owner’s revenue is also connected 
with ratings, which naturally makes it a concern for the platform owner. All the above facts suggest that in 
the app market ratings play a very significant role, if not a central role, in determining both the success of 
an app and the prosperity of the entire market. 
Given its great importance, our study focuses on the impact of rating on the app market in terms of the 
consumer’s choice of purchase, the developer’s choice of app price and quality level, and the platform 
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owner’s choice of revenue sharing policy. We model the ratings by explicitly characterizing the consumer 
rating behavior and synthesizing it into the model at fundamental level, i.e., into the consumer’s utility 
function. Then we derive the developer’s optimal choice of app price and quality level based on the 
consumer’s rating-dependent utility function. Ultimately the platform owner’s decision on revenue 
sharing policy will also be associated with the consumer rating behavior due to the revenue sharing 
contract with the developer. 
We account that the consumer rating behavior consists of two processes. One is to offer ratings, also 
referred as ex post ratings, based on ex post user experience which can be quantified by the consumer’s 
received net utility after purchase (Kuksov and Xie 2010). The other is to accept ex post ratings as 
translating them into ex ante perceived net utility. Combining these two processes we eventually construct 
a bidirectional rating-utility system in which we call the former as utility-to-rating process and the latter 
as rating-to-utility process. Instead of not taking into account the rating behavior as previous literature (Li 
and Hitt 2010; Sun 2010), we characterize the consumer rating behavior in both process. To model the 
subjective rating behavior in the utility-to-rating process, we assume a positive linear relationship 
between ex post rating and received net utility, which we call as rating function. For the rating-to-utility 
process, we introduce a new concept, reservation rating. Reservation rating is defined as the ex post rating 
which signifies zero received net utility in consumers’ ex ante perception. Based on reservation rating, a 
linear function between ex post rating and ex ante perceived net utility is established with potentially 
different slope and intercept than rating function.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following two aspects. First, this paper proposes an 
analytical framework which fundamentally synthesizes the consumer rating behavior with economic 
utility theory by constituting a bidirectional rating-utility system. While we take app market as our 
research context, the bidirectional rating-utility system methodology can be applied in any market where 
consumer rating plays an important role in consumer’s purchase decision. The concept of reservation 
rating invented for rating-to-utility process is an attempt to systematically model how consumers 
interpret ratings into net utility. Moreover, in our paper, we provide a justification from the economic 
utility theory angle to show the principle that over-leniency is detrimental to quality, which is empirically 
revealed by management behavioral literatures.  
Second, based on above rating-utility system, our paper studies the impact of consumer subjective rating 
behavior on the consumer’s choice, the developer’s choice, and the platform owner’s revenue sharing 
policy for the newly emerging app market. We provide results which are coincided with the evidences in 
real business practice and generate important managerial implications for the platform owners and 
developers in the app business, including how the change in consumer rating behavior would change their 
profit and how they should optimally react to the various consumer rating behaviors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a review of the related 
literatures. This is followed by the model and findings. Then, we conclude the paper by summarizing the 
results and providing discussions about the directions for future research. 
Literature Review 
The literature on effects of online word-of-mouth has been proliferating rapidly during the last ten years. 
Most of them are empirical work in the context of movie and book industry, focusing on the effects of 
online word-of-mouth (WOM) in predicting or influencing sales revenue (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; 
Dellarocas 2004; Liu 2006; Duan et al. 2008). Dellarocas (2004) demonstrated that the online rating is a 
useful proxy for WOM in movie industry and it serves as one of the predictors for the movie’s total 
revenue. Dellarocas and Narayan (2006) identified three metrics of online word-of-mouth: valence, 
variance and volume, in which valence is usually denoted by the average numeric average rating, variance 
is usually denoted by its statistical variance or entropy (Godes and Mayzlin 2004), and volume is counted 
as the number of ratings. Liu (2006) showed that the online WOM has significant explanatory power for 
box office revenue while the volume is stronger than valence. Duan et al. (2008) revealed that movies’ 
online WOM valence significantly affects the volume which in turn determines the box office 
performance. For book market, Chen et al. (2004) found that the consumer rating is only a predictor for 
the book sales. However, Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) showed that improvement of the online WOM 
valence would increase the book sales based on the data from Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com. 
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Forman (2008) also demonstrated that raters offer the rating more positively to the review with identity 
information and disclosure of identity information would increase the sales.  
Researcher also investigated the connection between consumer ratings and sales in the context of other 
markets such as beer, DVD and video games (Clemsons 2006, Hu et al. 2008, Zhu et al. 2010). Little 
attention has been paid to the software market. One reason might be the online software selling has not 
been widely established until the app market appears. Zhou and Duan (2010) stated that evidence from 
CNET download.com shows increase in product variety strengthens the impact of positive consumer 
reviews but weakening the impact of negative ones. It also showed that positive professional reviews leads 
to more software download.  
Given the above connection between the online WOM and the product sales, it is the natural next step for 
researchers to conceive firms’ optimal strategy to adapt such connection. A growing body of literature has 
been devoted onto this topic and most of them are on analytical side. Chen and Xie (2005) showed that 
firm should choose advertising instead of price to adapt consumer review when sufficient consumers 
value the product’s horizontal features. Dellarocas (2006) demonstrated how firms’ shilling behavior, i.e. 
post anonymous messages that exalt their products on the purpose of changing the consumers’ 
perception, will influence the firms’ profits and consumers’ surplus. Chen and Xie (2008) revealed that 
when and how the sellers should adjust their marketing communication strategy by changing product 
attribute information to adapt the consumer reviews. Kuksov and Xie (2010) studied the firm’s optimal 
pricing and whether the firm should give an unexpected frill to early customers to boost their product 
experience. Li and Hitt (2010) both analytically and empirically showed that uni-dimensional ratings are 
more correlated with the value of the product rather than quality of the product. Firms need to account for 
price effects and could better serve the consumers by setting up the review system which explicitly 
separates the perceived value and perceived quality. Jiang and Chen (2007) considered both consumer 
reviews and consumer ratings and found that firms may have incentive to under-change in the early 
period.  
Most of above firms’ adaption strategies are implicitly based on the underlying assumption that ratings 
can signal the underlying true quality (or true value) to novice consumers at least in an expectation sense. 
However, it seems to be not always true, at least not always in a precise manner. The topic concerning 
how precise the ratings reflect the underlying true quality, an issue involved with consumer rating 
behavior, becomes increasingly popular in rating-relate research area. Hu et al. (2006) empirically 
showed that in presence of under-reporting, i.e., only extremely satisfied or extremely unsatisfied 
consumers would rate, consumers may not extract the true quality from the ratings if only valence (mean 
value) is known. Sun (2010) analytically demonstrated that consumers in subsequent period can figure 
out the exact product’s true quality from the distribution of the ratings given by consumers in previous 
period.  Li and Hitt (2008) showed that later consumers’ perception on the quality may be biased because 
of the biased ratings left by early buyers whose preferences on quality are quite different from later ones’. 
Hu (2009) summarized two self-selection bias, purchasing bias which is partially mentioned in Li and Hit 
(2008), and under-reporting bias mentioned in Hu (2006), as two reasons which potentially lead to 
biased perception on true quality under certain circumstances. Moe and Trusov (2010), Moe and 
Schweidel (2011) also empirically showed that consumer rating behavior is significantly affected by 
previously posted rating. Lee (2009) demonstrated that social imitation and learning affect can influence 
user rating generation. 
Another important aspect of rating behavior which influences appraisal accuracy is the systematic rater 
error. While having not been noticed in the context of online WOM, it has been studied in the 
management literature for decades (Borman 1977; Kane 1994, Kane et al. 1995; Saal et al. 1980; Yun et al. 
2005). Managers will make different inference on one employee’s productivity when assessing the same 
sheet of his performance rating. Having the random rating error removed, this subjectivity has been 
demonstrated to be systematic (Kane 1994) if no control effort is made upon its systematic sources. 
Obviously this is the case for app market since consumers on the app market are under no control for 
their characters like maturity, conscientiousness and degree of sophistication in using apps, which could 
serve as such systematic resources. Kane (1994) also summarized the rating error into multiple categories 
and point out that leniency and severity are two important ones which could be potentially systematic. 
Kane et al. (1995) demonstrated that rating leniency is the most troublesome rating error and found it to 
be a relatively stable response tendency. Spence and Keeping (2010) suggested that when managers give 
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performance rating to their employees, more experienced managers are associated with lower ratings, 
which is less degree of leniency. Berger et al. (2010) empirically showed that under the situation that 
employees’ bonus payments are associated with ratings, a forced distribution requirement on ratings 
actually lead higher productivity than that under unforced distribution which is more skewed towards the 
higher rating values than forced one. This is especially intriguing to our research since by analogy 
consumers in our context are more or less alike managers who rate developers’ apps and consequently 
developers’ revenue are associated with those ratings. 
The Model 
Suppose the platform owner, the app developer and the app consumer are the three players on the app 
market. A three-stage dynamic game theoretic model is constructed here to study the equilibrium of the 
market. At the first stage, the platform owner determines and publicizes the developer’s revenue-sharing 
percentage. By observing this percentage at the beginning of the second stage, the developer chooses 
either not to adopt and then exit the market, or to adopt and then determine the optimal quality level and 
optimal app price. If the developer chooses not to adopt the game ends. Otherwise, at the third stage, 
consumers decide whether to purchase or not. If purchased, they rate the app based on the received net 
utility. The third stage is repeated such that after a sufficient time period the rating becomes steady. The 
goals of the platform owner and the developer are to maximize their own benefit in this steady-state 
respectively. A developer would choose to participate when the profit is greater or equal to zero. 
Consumers would make the purchases when the expected net utility is greater or equal to zero. 
Before deriving the propositions regarding the equilibrium, we elaborate several essential preliminaries 
which serve as the foundation of our model analysis. 
Rating Function 
We assume the linear relationship between the received net utility and the ex post rating. Since the rating 
is bounded between 0 and 1, the mathematical formula is given by: 
 { }{ }0min 1,max 0,rating ku r= +     (1) 
u  is the received net utility. 
0
r  is the ex post zero net utility rating which is an important concept in 
measuring the degree of severity. Low 
0
r  indicates that consumers are severe with respect to offering 
ratings. k  is the rating-utility conversion rate. It represents the consumer’s sensitivity of the ex post 
rating on difference in received net utility. The rating function models the subjectivity of rating behavior. 
For example, in the utility-to-rating process under a typical 10-point rating system, it is rather the 
consumer’s subjective opinion to rate 
0
4.0r =  or 
0
6.0r =  when received net utility is exactly zero. 
The Received Net Utility 
In the similar spirit of Chen and Xie 2008, we partition the consumers into two groups. One consists of all 
the high valuation consumers who consider the app match their taste so that they appreciate the quality. 
The other consists of all the low valuation consumers who consider the app mismatch their taste so that 
they don’t appreciate the quality. Then the received net utility of these two groups, which is associated 




u q p u p= − = − .  (2) 
We denote b as the fraction of consumers who belong to high valuation group and then the fraction for 
the low valuation group is 1 b− . It is worthwhile noticing that b  is an indicator of the developer’s 
marketing performance. Large b  represents high marketing performance since most of consumers are 
“matched”.  We suppose ( )0,1b∈ . 
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The Reservation Rating 
Followed the definition of “reservation rating” in the introduction section, we would further explain how it 
fits into the economic utility theory. Reservation rating is not only intuitively a bar which the app needs to 
pass in order to be considered for purchase, but also fundamentally affects the consumers' willingness to 
pay. It works as a “ruler origin” to measure the ex ante perceived net utility from an app. For instance, 
with regard to a 5-star rating system, when a consumer with reservation rating of 3.5 stars observes an 
app with current rating of 4.5 stars, she/he would expect some positive net utility from the app. And a 
maximum rating of 5 stars would elevate this expectation. In other words, combining the reservation 
rating and the current ex post rating, the consumer will figure out their ex ante perceived net utility. 
In the base model, the reservation rating 
R
r  is assumed to be homogenous among all consumers.  Suppose 
r  is the ex post rating given from high valuation consumers. The ex ante perceived net utility of a 







=  (3) 
In order to distinguish the degree of criticism between utility-to-rating and rating-to-utility processes, we 
call that consumers with low 
0
r  are “severe” and consumers with high 
R
r  are “critical”. Since people are 
generally more critical in accepting ratings than offering ratings, we assume that 
0R
r r> .  
Next, we derive the consumer’s expected net utility ( )E U  . We suppose that both the true quality level 
and the type of valuation are unknown to the consumer before she/he experiences the app. However, 
through examining the distribution of app’s ex post rating she/he would discover the probability of being 
in the high valuation group is b  and the probability of being in the low valuation group is 1 b− . Hence, 
the expected net utility is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 eE U b p b u= − ⋅ − + ⋅  (4) 
when ( ) 0E U ≥ , the consumer would make the purchase.  
The developer’s profit is given by: 
 2
D
u ps hq= −  (5) 
where h  is the developer’s cost rate on quality and 0h > . The quadratic form of the overall cost 
2hq represents the diminishing return of investment on quality (Choudhary 2007). The condition for the 
developer to participate is 0
D
u ≥ . The developer seeks to maximize her/his profit by choosing optimal p  
and q  given the demand side’s constraint ( ) 0E U ≥ .   
The platform owner’s revenue is given by: 
 ( )1Pu p s= −  (6) 
where s  is bounded between 0 and 1. The platform owner’s goal is to find the optimal *s  which 
maximizes 
P
u .  
It is worthwhile mentioning that in our model the platform owner’s cost is neglected. Regarding app 
hosting cost, we believe it is already covered by a fix annual fee paid by the developer. For example, Apple 
iOS platform charges $99 for annual membership to allow a developer upload her/his apps on the Apple 
App Store. We also speculate this membership fee may not be the major revenue source. The evidence is 
nowadays roughly 350,000 apps are available on the Apple App Store. Even under the most extreme case 
that one app correspond to one developer, the annual revenue from this fix membership fee is 35 million 
at most, which account for less than 4% of the total platform owner’s app sales revenue. Meanwhile, 
regarding this membership fee, once the developer decides to participate, it is the sunk cost which doesn’t 
affect their optimal choice of quality level and price.  
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Table 1 summarizes the notations of the base model. In the succeeding part of model extensions, new 
notations will join under the same stylized fashion and will be clarified at corresponding part of the paper.  
Table 1 Model parameters and decision variables 
Parameters 
k  Rating-utility conversion rate 
0
r  Ex post zero net utility rating 
R
r  Reservation rating 
r  Ex post rating from high valuation group consumers 
b  Fraction of consumers in the high valuation group 
h  Developer’s cost rate on quality 
Decision variables 
q    Quality level of the app 
p  Price of the app 
s  Developer’s revenue sharing percentage 
 
Proposition 1. Given the revenue sharing percentage s , the developer’s optimal choice of price *p  and 
quality level *q  are: 
Region 1-1 (self-driven): where 
1
b b>  and 
1
0 h h s< ≤  ,   
 
( )
( ) ( )






b r br r b r
p q
k b k b
− − − +
= =
− −
;   (7) 
Region 1-2 (platform owner driven): where 
1
b b>  and  
1 2
h s h h s< ≤ ,   
 









= + = ;   (8) 
Region 1-3 (poor marketing): where 
1
b b≤  and  
3
0 h h s< ≤ ,   
 
( )
( ) ( )






b r br r b r
p q
k b k b
− − − +
= =
− −
.   (9) 























































Proposition 1 shows that the developer’s optimal choice of price and quality level are divided into three 
possible cases, depending upon her/his marketing performance b  and cost rate h .  
Generally speaking, higher quality level q  will lead to higher ex post ratings from high valuation 
consumers. It would increase subsequent consumers’ ex ante perceived net utility as well as the 
consumer’s willingness to pay. Thus, the developer can gain from charging a higher app price p  to exploit 
the additional willingness to pay. For the developer in Region 1-1, because of the low cost rate 
(
1
0 h sh< ≤ ), the marginal gain from improving app quality is always greater than its marginal cost until r  
Economics and Value of Information Systems 
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reaches its maximum. Once the ex post rating hit the maximum allowed rating, the developer’s further 
efforts on increasing consumer’s received utility will no longer be reflected by the ex post ratings, which 
means the further improvement on quality becomes unobservable to subsequent consumers in the rating-
to-utility process. Therefore, her/his optimal quality level *
1
q  is the one at which high valuation 
consumers will offer the maximum rating (Define *r  as the r under optimal price and quality level and 
notice that * * *
1 1 0
( ) 1r k q p r= − + = ) . In Region 1-2, when her/his marketing performance is also good but 
the cost rate is high (
2 1
h hs sh≥ > ), marginal cost from improving app quality increases faster than that in 
Region 1-1 so that it will surpass the marginal gain before the maximum 1r =  is realized. Thus the r  in 
Region 1-2 will be between 
R
r  and 1. In Region 1-3, the optimal price *p  and quality level *q  are of the 
same analytical form as Region 1-1. It indicates when the developer’s marketing performance is poor and 
the cost rate is relatively low (
3
0 h sh< ≤ ), the developer’s optimal choice is to choose the quality level at 
which 1r = . The intuition behind is that since only a few consumers who belong to high valuation type 
would appreciate the quality and rate positively after purchase, the developer need to provide sufficient 
satisfaction to them, making them rate as high as possible to counteract the low ratings from mismatched 
consumer group. Otherwise because the overall rating is too low the subsequent consumer’s ex ante 
perceived net utility as well as their willingness to pay would be too low.   
 
Figure 1 Developer’s optimal choices given s  
Figure 1 depicts the developer’s * * * *, , ,
D
p q r u  in Region 1-1 and Region 1-2.  It shows all of them are non 
increasing function of the developer’s cost rate h .  
Corollary 1.1 For the developer in Region 1-2, * / 0p s∂ ∂ >  and * / 0q s∂ ∂ > .  
Corollary 1.1 shows that for the developer in Region 1-2, her/his optimal choice of quality level and price is 
driven by the revenue percentage she/he obtain. By increasing s , the platform owner can provide more 
incentive to the developer to improve her/his app quality.  
For the developer in Region 1-1, optimal quality level is not affected by s . Therefore hereafter we give an 
intuitive name for Region 1-1, “self-driven region”. Developers in this region are referred as self-driven 
developers. We give another name for Region 1-2, “platform owner driven” region. We refer developers in 
that region as “platform owner driven developers”. For Region 1-3, we name it “poor marketing region” 
and the developers are referred to “poor marketing developers”.  Since poor marketing region is unlikely 
to be the main component of the market, we focus our attention on the self-driven region and platform 
owner driven region. 
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Figure 2 Developer’s optimal choices as function of s   
Notice that the boundaries of the regions (
1 2
,h s h s ) are proportional to revenue sharing percentage s  
which is set by the platform owner at the first stage of the game. This indicates that given a developer’s 
cost rate h , whether she/he would choose to be in self-driven region or platform owner region, not only 




r r ), but also depends the platform owner’s 
choice of s . Figure 2 illustrate that as s  increases, the developer with a given h  could switch from 
platform owner driven to self-driven. More detailed, when the developer is in platform owner driven 
region, increasing in s  would increase the *q  and *p  until the r  hit the maximum. Then the developer 
enter the self-driven region and *q  and *p are no longer function of s . 
Corollary 1.2 In all regions, the developer’s optimal price * / 0
R
p r∂ ∂ < . In self-driven region, the optimal 
quality * / 0
R
q r∂ ∂ < . In platform owner driven region, the optimal quality * / 0
R
q r∂ ∂ = . 
Corollary 1.2 shows how developer should optimally respond to consumer’s more critical view in accepting 
ratings. When 
R
r  increases, the original optimal price can no longer be justified by the rating. The 
developer in any of those regions need to decrease the app price. Platform owner driven developers would 
keep the same quality level while self-driven developers would choose a lower quality level. This is 
because in self-driven region, as long as this maximum 1r =  is realized, further quality improvement 
would not promote the consumers’ perception on ex ante net utility. Since the price drops as stated above, 
the required quality level to achieve the maximum 1r =  decreases. 
Corollary 1.3 In self-driven region, *
0
/ 0q r∂ ∂ <  and *
0
/ 0p r∂ ∂ =  . In platform owner driven region, 
*
0
/ 0p r∂ ∂ >  and *
0
/ 0.q r∂ ∂ =  
When the consumer becomes more severe in offering ratings, which means 
0
r  decreases, for the platform 
owner driven developer, the best way is to decrease the price. However, the self-driven developer’s 
optimal response is to choose a higher quality level but keep the price unchanged.  This is because when 
0
r  decreases, the r  will no longer be maximum. Thus the self-driven developer regains the incentive to 
choose a higher quality since the consumer would be able to observe and appreciate such improvement 
again.  
Corollary 1.3 is coincided in spirit with management literature that over-leniency is a significant issue. 
Berger et al 2010’s discovered empirically in the corporate environment a forced distribution on 
performance ratings will lead to higher productivity. We show that when 
0
r  increases (more lenient), the 
“productivity” indicator *q  decrease. We make the analogy to the app market context and confirm the 
same principle through providing an explanation from the angle of economic utility theory. 
Economics and Value of Information Systems 
10 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  




r r  . Figure 3 shows that when 
R
r  increases, the 
platform owner driven region shrinks but self-driven region expands. For a developer in platform owner 
driven region, she/he may switch to self-driven when 
R
r  increases. It also shows how such developer’s 
choice of optimal quality level and optimal price change across different regions.  
Figure 4 shows that when 
0
r  increases, both the total region expands and self-driven region expands. 
Similarly, the developer may switch from platform owner driven to self-driven region when 
0
r  increases.    
 
Figure 3 & 4 Region distribution and developer’s optimal choices across regions 
Proposition 2.  The platform owner’s optimal choice of developer’s revenue sharing percentage *s is  
Region 2-1 (squeezing): when 
1
b b>  and 
21















Region 2-2-1 (encouragement): when 
1
b b>  and 
21 2










= + ; (11) 
Region 2-2-2 (retention): when 
1
b b>  and 
2 2
2 / 3h h h< ≤ , 
  Hao et. al. / Economic Role of Rating Behavior in App Market  








= ;  (12) 
Region 2-3: when 
1
b b≤  and 
3
0 h h< ≤ , 
 
( )








h br br r
s















br br r r
−
=
+ − − −
. 
Proposition 2 characterizes the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game. It shows how the 
platform owner at first stage should offer different revenue sharing percentage s  to different type of 
developers depending upon their cost rate h  and marketing performance b . The SPNE take into account 
the developer’s best response in the second stage. For example, when the platform owner believes its 
profit 
P
u  is maximized if the developer chooses self-driven region at the second stage, the platform owner 
at the first stage chooses to offer *
1
s  to incentivize the developer to do so. 
Corollary 2.1 In all regions, the optimal revenue sharing percentage * / 0s h∂ ∂ > . 
 
Figure 5 Platform owner’s optimal choices of s  
Corollary 2.1 suggests among all regions, the platform owner should increase the developer’s revenue 
sharing percentage when their cost rate increases. Figure 5 depicts the optimal revenue sharing 
percentage s  as a function of the cost rate h . Regarding Region 2-2-1 (encouragement) and Region 2-2-2 
(retention), they essentially correspond to the platform owner driven region in Proposition 1. Figure 1 
shows that when the platform owner driven developer’s cost rate increases, the optimal quality level *q  
decreases. Corollary 2.1 indicates that in this situation the platform owner should offer a higher revenue 
sharing percentage to drive the quality level back for platform owner’s best interest. Although the 
platform owner’s percentage share decreases because of giving more to the developer, it would eventually 
pay the platform owner back through the additional revenue gained from the consumer because of the 
higher quality app.  
Regarding Region 2-1 (squeezing), it essentially corresponds to the self-driven region in Proposition 1. As 
we know the optimal quality *q  is not a function of revenue sharing percentage s  for self-driven 
developers, the argument for the dynamics between *s and h  in Region 2-2-1 and Region 2-2-2 is no 
longer valid. The real situation is that if the platform owner knows that the developer has a lower cost rate 
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h  in Region 2-1, the platform owner can squeeze the developer by giving a lower s  because under such 
low s  the developer still can get non-negative utility due to the low cost rate and it is still the developer’s 
best interest to achieve the same *q  at which 1r =  and charge the same *p . Therefore the platform owner 
acquires more revenue from the decreased s  . 
Squeezing the developers may be dangerous since they may leave. One argument why low cost rate 
developer doesn’t leave this platform even when receiving low revenue sharing percentage lies in our 
assumption that the platform owner is the monopoly or has the monopoly power over the market, such as 
predominance in consumer base. For example, Apple still grasps roughly 70 percent of the entire mobile 
app market and this number is 99.4 percentage two years ago. The developers are allured by the large 
number of potential customers. Another reason is that consumers using different platforms are usually 
separated, for example, chances are little that one consumer is both iPhone user and Andriod phone user. 
Since the cannibalization is a mild issue, the developer could earn more profit by releasing its app on 
another platform as long as she/he can earn positive benefit from that platform. For example, a famous 
game app, “Angry birds”, has been made available for both iPhone and Andriod. 
Based on the above discussion, we give more interpretive names to the regions in Proposition 2. Region 2-
1 is referred to as “squeezing region”. Region 2-2-1 is named as “encouragement region” since the 
platform owner would increase s  to encourage them to increase the quality of app when h  becomes 
higher. Region 2-2-2 is referred to as “retention region” since those developers’ profits are zero, which 
indicates they are on the verge to leave the platform. The platform owner should set a high s  to retain 
them so that the platform owner can continually obtain revenue from apps they produce. The developer in 
squeezing region will be incentivized to choose self-driven region in second stage. The developer in 
encouragement and retention region will be incentivized to choose platform owner driven region in 
second stage. From Figure 5 we can see the developer whose cost rate is around the intersection of 
squeezing region and encouragement region can obtain the highest utility. Lower cost rate developer’s 
utility will be squeezed. The extreme case is when the cost rate is close to zero the platform owner can 
almost take nearly all the revenue but leave very little share to the developer. The developer’s 
participation can still be justified because developing such quality app cost almost nothing for her/him. 
Corollary 2.2 In encouragement and retention region, * 1/ 2s >  
This coincides with our observation from the real business practice. For instance, Apple iOS platform 
offers 0.7s = . For app market, given the fact that a large portion of the developers are individuals or 
development teams made up of several individuals, the platform owner may consider the majority of cost 
rates are on the higher side in encouragement or retention region, rather than in squeezing region. 
Therefore, it is the optimal strategy for the platform owner to offer a revenue sharing percentage greater 
than one half. 
Corollary 2.3 The optimal revenue sharing percentage * / 0
R
s r∂ ∂ >  in encouragement and retention 
regions, but * / 0
R
s r∂ ∂ <  in squeezing region. 
According to Proposition 1, when consumers become more critical in accepting ratings, the developer in 
encouragement or retention region would decrease the price. Such price drop decreases the total revenue. 
By raising an appropriate amount in s , the developer in encouragement region would choose a higher 
quality and then correspondingly increase the price, which compensates the decrease in platform owner’s 
revenue share such that eventually benefits the platform owner. 
The argument for squeezing region is a little counterintuitive. It states that in squeezing region when the 
consumer’s reservation rating increases the platform owner prefers squeezing the developer more, rather 
than incentivizing the developer by offering more revenue share. The underlying logic is the following. 
Notice in Proposition 1, the boundary of self-driven region 
1
h s  increases as 
R
r  increase. For the developer 
in squeezing region, she/he would still choose self-driven region at second stage when 
R
r  increases. The 
optimal quality, app price and the total app sale revenue are determined by the new 
R
r , not s . Given more 
*
s  would not further promote the choice of quality level as the case in encouragement region but only 
subsidizing more revenue sharing to the developer. Instead, if the platform owner decrease the s , as long 
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as decreased s still make the developer stay in self-driven region, i.e. maintain the choice of price and 
quality level, the platform owner would benefit from decreasing s . However, the platform owner cannot 
decreases significantly. Illustrated in Figure 2, given the developer’s cost rate h , when s  decreases 
significantly the developer originally in self-driven region may switch to platform owner driven (notice 
1
h s  decreases).From the developer’s perspective, it turns out to be that moving to platform owner region 
will incur greater loss than staying in self-driven region with less revenue percentage if there is only an 
appropriate reduction in s . Choosing between two “evils”, the developer believes it is her/his best interest 
to stay in self-driven region. Hence the platform owner is able to squeeze. 
Corollary 2.4 The optimal revenue sharing percentage *
0




r  increases, i.e., consumers generally offer higher ratings, the developer in encouragement or 
retention region would charge a higher price and keep the same choice of quality level. Higher price 
indicates higher revenue so that the platform owner can take out more shares of the additional revenue 
through decreased s . For the developer in squeezing region, the optimal price doesn’t change but the 
optimal quality level decreases since consumers are more lenient in offering ratings. The argument why 
*
s  decreases is similar to the case where Rr  increases in squeezing region in Corollary 2.3. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we parameterize consumer rating behavior into three parameters ( )0, , Rk r r and construct a 
bidirectional rating-utility system which incorporates these parameters into utility calculation. We apply 
such framework to the app market where ratings play a central role in determining the consumer’s ex ante 
perceived net utility as well as their willingness to pay. We identify three types of developers, self-driven, 
platform owner driven and poor marketing developer, based decisions on optimal choice of quality level 
and price given such consumer’s choice. We provide comprehensive analysis on how change in consumer 
rating behavior ( )0 , Rr r  would change developers’ optimal choices of quality level and price. We also 
provide the dynamics of the platform owner’s optimal choice of revenue sharing policy when ( )0 , Rr r  alter. 
We analytically identify the over-leniency issue from our rating-utility economic model, a famous issue 
which has been demonstrated in many behavioral management literatures, and then justify that it exhibits 
the characteristics shown empirically by those literatures.   
As mentioned in introduction section, this paper provides a fundamental way to incorporate rating 
behavior into traditional utility-based analysis. In this sense, one possible direction of future research is to 
study the impact of rating behavior on other aspects of traditional industrial organization (IO) research 
such as competition and product differentiation. Many IO work rely on full information assumptions, 
such as the ex ante observable quality so as to utility.  Signals such as ratings now can be embedded in 
utility theory therefore replicating those works on basis of rating behavior would be implementable. 
Research questions such as how to compete on ratings and how consumer rating behavior affects the 
market competition would be interesting. The impact of rating behavior on product differentiation 
strategy, such as how the developer can take advantage of ratings to implement the ex ante perception on 
product differentiation, would also be another intriguing topic to explore. 
Another opportunity for extension is from behavioral angle. Extant behavioral research suggests that the 
heterogeneity of scaling in rating system, for example, 5-star scale rating system and 10-point scale rating 
system would induce discrepancy and bias in ratings behavior. An 8.0 in 10-point rating has potentially 
different meaning than 4-star in 5-star scale ratings system for the same person. Thus an interesting 
question is how the platform owner designs an appropriate rating scale to manipulate the consumer 
rating behavior on the purpose of approaching the optimal ( )0, , Rk r r  demonstrated in this paper.  
Furthermore, we notice not only the characteristics of platform owner’s optimal ( )0, , Rk r r  vary between 
squeezing region and encouragement region but also does the optimal revenue sharing percentage. This 
discrepancy provides the platform owner the incentive to separate out these two regions into multi store 
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fronts. Being aware that organizational developers like software companies usually have relatively low 
cost rate so that being more likely to site in squeezing region, the platform owner may want to set up an 
additional storefront, called “corporate app store”, in complementary to “individual app store” where 
individual developers are seated in. Then the platform owner may design different rating system and 
adopt different revenue sharing percentage to these two stores, for their own profit maximization. We 
believe as the app market expands rapidly, a greater degree of heterogeneity on app supply side would be 
expected so that such separation may be profitable. 
Finally, this paper speculates the existence of reservation rating (
R
r ). This calls for empirical observation 
of such phenomenon by, for example, analyzing online WOM data. This paper can provide an economic 
structure to formulate potential structural econometric models. This research stream can lead to the 
answers to some interesting questions such as what factors cause the differences in individual reservation 
ratings. 
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